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Per Se Treatment:
An Unnecessary Relic of Antitrust Litigation
ADAM WEG*
INTRODUCTION
Over the past thirty years, the Supreme Court's test for finding a
violation of the Sherman Act for certain types of business agreements
has changed significantly.' Prior to that time, several types of agreements
were illegal "per se,"2 while others were judged by a "rule of reason. '
Per se treatment is based solely on the existence of the offending
agreements in the marketplace.' An agreement violates the Sherman Act
if it falls into one of the per se illegal categories Conversely, a rule-of-
reason analysis (which has recently been supplemented with "quick-
look" analysis) allows a court to delve further into the intricacies of an
agreement by examining the purpose, power, and effect of the
agreement. As the complexity of products and the need for cooperation
by market competitors has increased in recent years, the Court has
moved several types of agreements from the per se category to the rule-
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2009; B.A., Cornell
University. I would like thank Professor James McCall for all of his generosity, his incredible
understanding of the intricacies and complexities of antitrust jurisprudence, and his help on this Note
specifically. Thanks also to the editors of the Hastings Law Journal for their hard work on this Note.
Finally, thanks to my friends and family, especially my father Howard, for their love, support, and
encouragement throughout the writing and editing process.
i. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2721-22 (2007)
(recounting the Court's movement away from a "per se" test to a "rule of reason" during this period);
see also infra Part I.C.
2. See infra Part I.B.
3. See infra Part I.A.
4. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 0958); see also Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C.
§ I (2006) ("Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every
person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be
illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not
exceeding $ioo,ooo,ooo if a corporation, or, if any other person, $t,ooo,ooo, or by imprisonment not
exceeding io years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.").
5. N. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 5.
6. Id.; Bd. of Trade v. United States (Chi. Bd. of Trade), 246 U.S. 231, 238-39 (i918).
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of-reason category by weighing the procompetitive justifications against
the anticompetitive effects for agreements previously held to be per se
illegal.7
Several kinds of agreements remain per se illegal in the eyes of the
Court, but even these agreements potentially have procompetitive
justifications and, therefore, should receive a form of rule-of-reason
analysis instead. These include agreements that provide for horizontal
price fixing between businesses that compete with each other,
agreements among competitors to divide markets horizontally,
horizontal boycotts agreed to by a group of competitors, and vertical
tying agreements between manufacturers and distributors.9 Recently, the
Court has moved in this direction and found a category of agreements
that have traditionally been per se illegal to be subject to a rule-of-reason
analysis.'" In Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, Inc., the Court
held that an agreement that contemplates vertical minimum resale price
fixing is no longer subject to per se treatment under the Sherman Act,
but will instead be tested under the rule-of-reason analysis-that weighs
the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of the agreement to
determine its antitrust validity under the Act."
This Note will first examine the history and evolution of the per se
and rule-of-reason tests. The following Part will explore further
refinements that can be predicted in the wake of Leegin, taking into
7. See, e.g., Chi. Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238-39 (laying out the traditional rule-of-reason
analysis); see also Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2721-22 (2007);
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 110-20 (1984).
8. See Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2713; Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 48-50 (1990) (per
curiam) (explaining that several types of agreements still merit per se illegal treatment because they
unreasonably restrain trade in every instance and thus are contrary to the public interest); see also
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9-1I (1984); NCAA, 468 U.S. at 1O4-O5; United
States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333,338-39 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring); N. Pac. Ry., 356
U.S. at 4-6. These agreements are all what is commonly referred to as "restraints of trade." A restraint
of trade involves an "agreement between or combination of businesses intended to eliminate
competition, create a monopoly, artificially raise prices, or otherwise adversely affect the free market."
BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1340 (8th ed. 2004). A horizontal restraint is "[a] restraint of trade imposed
by agreement between competitors at the same level of distribution [i.e., between manufacturer and
manufacturer]." Id. A vertical restraint of trade is "[a] restraint of trade imposed by agreement
between firms at different levels of distribution (as between manufacturer and retailer)." Id. Also, it is
important to note that an unreasonable restraint of trade is commonly regarded as one "that produces
a significant anticompetitive effect." See id.
9. N. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 4-6.
so. See Palmer, 498 U.S. at 48-50; NCAA, 468 U.S. at uIo-2o; Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. I, 8-io (979); see also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 84-89
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (favorably discussing the idea that tying agreements, a traditional per se illegal
category under the Sherman Act, should be scrutinized under many of the very same standards as a
rule-of-reason analysis).
ii. See Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2714-20 (recognizing that very often per se treatment fails to
examine the detailed economic reasons (for example, competitive effects) that would make an
agreement legal or illegal under the Sherman Act).
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account the modern (post-Warren Court) tendency to avoid, or at the
very least steer away from, using per se treatment. The final Part will
focus on the potential advantages and disadvantages of this trend, along
with the accompanying legal, economic, and social implications.
Ultimately, this Note will point out that in light of accelerating
globalization of the legal, economic, and social environment, coupled
with the recent pro-business direction of the Court,' 2 per se antitrust
treatment is no longer an appropriate test to scrutinize modern business
agreements. Instead, agreements that provide for horizontal price fixing
among competitors, horizontal market divisions, horizontal boycotts, and
vertical tying agreements should be examined using either a quick-look
or rule-of-reason analysis.
I. HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF PER SE TREATMENT AND THE
RULE OF REASON
A. PER SE TREATMENT
Early in the twentieth century, the Supreme Court started
establishing the parameters for determining that certain categories of
agreements that involve anticompetitive conduct and effects violate the
antitrust laws. The first landmark decision came in Dr. Miles Medical Co.
v. John D. Park & Sons Co., where the Court held that resale minimum
price fixing was illegal per se under section I of the Sherman Act. 3 The
Court reasoned that if horizontal price fixing was historically barred by
the lower courts as a violation of the antitrust laws under the per se rule
then, by analogy, allowing manufacturers to fix vertical minimum resale
prices must be barred as a per se violation as well.'4 The Court explained
that
[t]o sustain the restraint [of trade], it must be found to be reasonable
both with respect to the public and to the parties and that it is limited
to what is fairly necessary, in the circumstances of the particular case,
for the protection of the [manufacturer]. Otherwise restraints of trade
are void as against public policy.'5
The Court later validated the premise of its holding in Dr. Miles by
finding horizontal price fixing agreements to be unreasonable and,
therefore, per se illegal in United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co.'6
In 1958 in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, the Court
finally articulated the four categories of agreements that receive per se
12. See infra Part III.
13. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 406-o9 (1911); see also Palmer,
498 U.S. at 48-50; Jefferson Parish. 466 U.S. at 9-t I.
14. Supra note 13.
15. Dr. Miles. 220 U.S. at 4o6.
t6. 310 U.S. 15O, 218 (940). For further discussion, see id. at 216-24.
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treatment: (i) horizontal price fixing, (2) market-division agreements,
(3) group boycotts, and (4) tie-in sales. 7 In 1967, the Court's decision in
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. added agreements that involve
vertical market divisions to the per se list.'
Since 1977, however, the Court has whittled away at the categories
of agreements that receive per se treatment. I' Previously, the Court
stressed that agreements that had no procompetitive, redeeming qualities
and thus were inherently and innately anticompetitive in nature, would
be found illegal per se with minimal proof.2" In its important 1977
decision in Continental TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., the Court held
that nonprice vertical restraints do have redeeming value and potential
propompetitive justification.' The Court reasoned that a manufacturer
with a small market share can attract more quality retailers within a
given market if the manufacturer is permitted to carve out intrabrand,
competition-free enclaves for its retailers. The Court explicitly
recognized that the Sherman Act can be used as a tool to protect
interbrand competition. 3 The decision marked a shift in the focus of a
Court that historically equated intrabrand competition with interbrand
competition. 4 Accordingly, in determining the legality of an agreement
under Sherman Act section I, the analysis requires balancing the
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of the agreement. 5
Agreements do not warrant per se treatment unless the Court can
determine that the anticompetitive effects almost always substantially
outweigh the procompetitive justifications. 6
17. 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). Market division occurs when competitors agree to sell in certain areas
and not in others. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2713 (2007);
Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49-50 (19go) (per curiam); see also infra Part.I.C. Group
boycotts occur when competitors agree not to do business with a buyer or seller with whom the
competitors would normally trade. See infra Part II.B. Tie-in sales occur when a seller in essence forces
a buyer who desires a certain product of the seller to also purchase an undesired product in order to
obtain the desired one. See infra Part II.A. Horizontal price fixing occurs when competitors agree to
charge the same price for an item. See infra Part II.D.
18. 388 U.S. 365, 372-73 (1967) (explaining that the vertical agreement between Schwinn, the
manufacturer, and its own distributors involving vertical market division was per se illegal under the
Sherman Act), overruled by Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
I9. See Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2721-22.
20. See Socony Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 216-24; Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 404-09.
21. 433 U.S. at 54-55. The Court here overruled its prior decision in Schwinn. Id. at 57-58. This
exemplifies the trend of the Court moving away from per se treatment towards a rule-of-reason
analysis in order to scrutinize each agreement on a case-by-case basis. See id.
22. Id. at 54-55.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 5 1-52.
25. Bd. of Trade v. United States (Chi. Bd. of Trade), 246 U.S. 231, 238-39 (1918) ("The true test
of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes
competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.").
26. Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § I (2oo6); United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 6o8
(1972) ("[Hlorizontal territorial limitations... are naked restraints of trade with no purpose except
1538 [Vol. 6o: 1535
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B. RULE-OF-REASON AND QUICK-LOOK ANALYSES
In 1918, the Court, in Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States,
established the methodology for applying a rule-of-reason analysis.27
First, the Court examines the purpose of the agreement to determine
whether it is anticompetitive or benign." A "benign" agreement is one
that promotes competition.29 If the purpose is benign, the Court then will
determine the existence of potentially procompetitive effects of the
agreement on competition in the relevant geographic and product
markets.3" In evaluating the possible procompetitive effects, the Court
considers both predictive expert testimony and the historic impact of
similar agreements.' The Court also examines the market power of the
parties involved, an examination that sheds light on the predictive effect
of the agreement on the market and competition in general.3"
Over the years, the Supreme Court recognized the increasing
complexity of the markets and the gravity of the procompetitive versus
anticompetitive analysis.33 Despite the additional time, expense, and
judicial resources required, the Court reduced the number of situations
in which the per se test applies and opened up the door to more frequent
use of the fact-specific, case-by-case evaluation required under the rule-
of-reason standard.34
This divide between the dismissive nature of per se treatment and
the increased expense and time the rule-of-reason criteria requires soon
gave rise to a middle ground test between the two extremes of antitrust
scrutiny by the Court. This middle ground came in 1978, in National
Society of Professional Engineers v. United States.35 The case involved an
stifling competition." (quoting White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963))).
27. 246 U.S. at 238-41.
28. See id.
29. See id. (explaining that the agreement in this case, although traditionally treated as per se
illegal, was benign in the sense that it "had no appreciable effect on general market prices; nor did it
materially affect the total volume of [the product in the market]," and that "within the narrow limits of
its operation the [agreement] helped to improve market conditions").
30. See id.
31. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2712-13 (2007) (considering
historic impact of similar agreements); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 86-88, 9o-94,
ioi-o6 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (considering predictive expert testimony).
32. See, e.g., Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2712-13; Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28,45-
46 (20o6); Chi. Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238-41.
33. See, e.g., Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2712-13; I. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 45-46; NCAA v. Bd. of
Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 110-13, 117-20 (1984); Chi. Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238-39.
34. See, e.g., NCAA, 468 U.S. at 110-13, 117-20; Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. 433 U.S.
36,47-59 (1977)-
35- 435 U.S. 679 (1978). Under the "middle ground" test, the Court would not summarily dismiss
certain agreements as per se illegal, but would not go into a full-blown, rule-of-reason analysis either.
See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 769-71 (I999) (discussing Nat'l Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs, 435
U.S. at 692; NCAA, 468 U.S. at Iio; FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986)). Instead,
the Court would only look to certain specific aspects of the agreement to determine if it was an
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association of engineers that attempted to justify a horizontal boycotting
agreement that excluded other associations of engineers from bidding on
potential projects. 6 The Association argued that their collective
agreement was rational and valid because they did not want their own
members putting in price bids for contracts, and then once they got the
contracts, cutting back the time they spent on engineering so they could
bring in other additional work.37 The additional work would generate
profit to keep up with competition among other engineers who were not
members of the association. 8 The agreement's purpose, according to the
Association, was to give its members security in their contracts while
simultaneously preventing them from putting in lower quality work on
existing contracts in an effort to continue to compete with nonmember
engineers for future contracts.39 The Court reasoned that this was not a
per se case and should get rule-of-reason analysis.4" However, the Court
reasoned that the premise of the Association's agreement was that price
competition is undesirable and would lead members to provide lower-
quality work, and perhaps endanger the public interest and health.'
Further, the Court held that a justification grounded in a belief that
competition was harmful in the relevant market is legally untenable and
thus, without a tenable, procompetitive justification, the rule-of-reason
analysis ends with a determination that the purpose of the contract is
illegal under Sherman section 1.42
The holding in Professional Engineers has led to a broader
procedure known now as a "quick look" analysis. This analysis begins
with an examination of the justification for an agreement, with the
requirement that the purpose would encourage the validity of
competition (a procompetitive justification).43 In NCAA v. Board of
unreasonable and anticompetitve restraint under the Sherman Act. See id. The Court eventually
labeled this "middle ground" framework the "quick look" analysis. See id.
36. Nat'l Socy of Profl Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 681.
37. Id. at 684-85,692-96.
38. Id. at 692-94.
39. Id. at 685 & n.7.
40. See id. at 692-96. Although the Court does not explicitly say that the agreement shall not
receive per se treatment, it takes a traditionally per se agreement involving horizontal boycotting by
price bidding, and actually does a more thorough investigation than is warranted under traditional per
se treatment. See id. This was the beginning of the Court's willingness to take some previously per se
illegal agreements, and give them a more detailed investigation regarding the competitive purpose of
the agreement. Clearly, this was not traditional per se treatment by the Court, but it was also not a
full-blown rule-of-reason analysis either because that would entail not only examination of the
competitive purpose, but also an examination of the power and effect of the agreement.
4 1 Id. at 693.
42. Id. at 694-96.
43. See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770-71 (1999). A quick-look analysis involves
examining the competitive purpose of the agreement to determine its legality, as opposed to also
examining the power and effect of the agreement. Id. at 769-71. This new method operates as a middle
ground between per se treatment and rule reason analysis. Id.
[Vol. 6o: 15351540
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Regents of the University of Oklahoma, the Court went further, noting
that in some industries horizontal restraints might be necessary to
produce a given product so long as the purpose was consistent with the
competition premise.' In that case, the Court evaluated the merits of a
plan that limited live broadcasting of college football teams by curtailing
members' freedom to negotiate and enter into their own television
contracts as individual schools.45 The Court held that the power and
effect of the agreement did not need to be ascertained in excruciating
detail and, very importantly, there was no need to define the relevant
market and determine the relevant market percentages. 6 Therefore, the
Court concluded, as a matter of law, that a naked restraint on price or
output was illegal without regard to the degree of market power
possessed by the competitors imposing the restraint.47 The plan
ultimately restricted output and set the product price-effects that are
inconsistent with the Sherman Act's recluirement that price and supply
be responsive to consumer preference. The Court was still willing to
look at the purpose and merits of the agreement, however, even though
it fell into the per se categories of horizontal price fixing.49 Therefore,
even with a procompetitive purpose, if the contract or agreement
between competitors is a naked restraint on price or output competition,
the Court will not need to determine market definition and market
power under a traditional rule-of-reason analysis.
These developments in Professional Engineers and NCAA
ultimately led to the establishment of the present quick-look analysis."
Under this analysis, the Court goes no further than to examine whether
the agreement has an invalid or anticompetitive purpose or a naked
restraint on price or output.5' The Court articulated this analysis in
California Dental Ass'n v. FTC in 1999, and added that the
44. 468 U.S. 85, lOl-O4 (1984).
45. Id. at 100-07.
46. Id. at 109-13. The NCAA's plan, on its face, made the price in the relevant market
unresponsive to consumer demand because no matter how desirable televised college football was to
the viewers, the market price for such exposure was being fixed by the NCAA. Id. at 128-29 (White,
J., dissenting).
47. Id. at lO9-1o (majority opinion) ("As a matter of law, the absence of proof of market power
does not justify a naked restriction on price or output. To the contrary, when there is an agreement not
to compete in terms of price or output, 'no elaborate industry analysis is required to demonstrate the
anticompetitive character of such an agreement."' (quoting Nat'l Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at
692)).
48. Id. at 109-13.
49. Id. at 117. This case marked a significant change by the Court. The agreement should have
been immediately dismissed as per se illegal but instead the Court (marking the current trend) moved
away from per se illegality and began to examine the purposes of even the most conspicuous
agreements. See id. at 117-20. This type of analysis is much more similar to a rule-of-reason or a quick-
look analysis.
50. See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 769-71 (1999).
51. Id. at 768-7o.
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procompetitive justification must have some intuitively obvious merit
before any market definition or economic data need to be scrutinized."
Consequently, the "quick-look" analysis of the Court has created a
middle ground between per se treatment and a full rule-of-reason
analysis where the Court will not dismiss an agreement initially because
of its mere existence as in per se treatment, but will only examine the
purpose of the agreement to determine the anticompetitive and
procompetitive justifications. This new middle form of analysis between
per se treatment and rule-of-reason analysis supports the Court's goal of
reducing the number of per se categories by no longer fearing it is
opening the door to the increased cost and time of a full-length rule-of-
reason litigation.53
C. THE LEEGIN DECISION
In 2007, the Court decided Leegin, moving further away from per se
treatment toward the rule-of-reason, or at least the quick-look analysis."
The Court recognized the increasing complexity of commercial
relationships, and that agreements between commercial entities are more
likely to have tenable procompetitive justifications.5 In Leegin, minimum
resale price maintenance was shown to stimulate interbrand competition
(i.e., "the competition among manufacturers selling different brands of
the same type of product") by reducing intrabrand competition (i.e., "the,, 56
competition among retailers selling the same brand"), contrary to the
holding and rules established years before in Dr. Miles.57 The Court
noted that there are several advantages and procompetitive effects that
58arguably justify minimum resale price restraints.5 First, minimum resale
52. Id. at 769-71, 778-81. The Court explained that because the agreement here had plausible
procompetitive justifications, a further investigation and analysis by the court of appeals was
warranted. Id. at 777-78. The Court implicitly reasons that when there is a potential procompetitive
justification under such circumstances, further analysis is needed. Id. By inference then, the Court is
also reasoning that without such an apparent procompetitive justification, such additional investigation
would not have been necessary.
53. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2712-13 (2007); United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3 d 34,47-48 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
54. 127 S. Ct. at 2713 ("[Tjhe per se rule is appropriate only after courts have had considerable
experience with the type of restraint at issue, and only if courts can predict with confidence that it
would be invalidated in all or almost all instances under the rule of reason.... '[W]e have expressed
reluctance to adopt per se rules... where the economic impact of certain practices is not immediately
obvious."' (citations omitted) (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3,10 (1997))).
55. Id. at 2713-15; see also Todd J. Anlauf, Severing Ties with the Strained Per Se Test for
Antitrust Tying Liability: The Economic and Legal Rationale for a Rule of Reason, 23 HAMLINE L. REV.
476, 508 (2000) ("Whether courts allow defendants to assert business justification or other claims as
limited affirmative defenses, a strict per se approach is untenable. Only that conduct which holds no
possible legal or economic justification should be subject to a strict per se rule.").
56. See Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2714-16.
57. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373,400 (911).
58. Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2720-23.
[Vol. 6o: 1535
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price restraints might foster interbrand competition. 9 Second, "[r]esale
price maintenance also has the potential to give consumers more options
so that they can choose among [more] low-price, low-service brands;
high-price, high-service brands; and brands that fall in between."" Third,
enforcement of these agreements is an efficient method of eliminating
the free-rider problem where discounting retailers "free ride on retailers
who furnish services and then capture some of the increased demand
those services generate" by preventing the discounter from undercutting
the service provider.6' Finally, "[w]ith price competition decreased, the
manufacturer's retailers should] compete [more vigorously] among
themselves over services."
Minimum resale price restraints' most significant procompetitive
justification, according to the Court, is that they can also promote
"interbrand competition by facilitating market entry for new firms and
brands."' "[I]f markets can be penetrated by using resale price
maintenance there is a procompetitive effect. ' '6' Also, this
encourage[es] retailer services that would not be provided even absent
free riding.... Offering the retailer a guaranteed margin and
threatening termination if it does not live up to expectations may be
the most efficient way to expand the manufacturer's market share by
inducing the retailer's performance and allowing it to use its own
initiative and experience in providing valuable services. 5
Disadvantages and potential anticompetitive effects of resale-minimum
price fixing include the possibility for retail cartels and higher profits for
inefficient retailers.6 However, the Court noted that the source of the
desired minimum resale price must be considered because, if the
retailers, as opposed to the manufacturer, want the minimum price, the
procompetitive justification might not be as strong.6
When discussing the rule-of-reason analysis to be applied under
Leegin, the Court pointed out that the single most important factor to
consider in reviewing agreements that call for either resale price
maintenance or nonprice restraints (customer and territorial restrictions)
is the total or collective market share of the firms employing these types
59. Id. at 2715 ("Minimum resale price maintenance can stimulate interbrand competition-the
competition among manufacturers selling different brands of the same type of product-by reducing
intrabrand competition -the competition among retailers selling the same brand.").
6o. Id.
61. Id. at 2715-t6.




66. Id. at 2716-17.
67. Id. at 2719-20.
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of agreements. 68 If all the firms in a market impose resale price fixing,
this will potentially restrain both interbrand and intrabrand
competition-a key factor in determining the legality of the agreement.
69
Regardless of the validity of the Leegin holding, the decision
underscores the continued trend of the Court to move consistently away
from per se treatment and toward a rule-of-reason analysis for even
those types of agreements that used to be in the per se illegal categories.7'
Presumably, as the markets for products become more complex and
industries continue to develop, plausible procompetitive justifications
will emerge for what were previously considered the most
anticompetitive types of agreements-those that traditionally receive per
se treatment.
II. JUSTIFICATION FOR ABOLISHING THE REMAINING
CATEGORIES OF PER SE TREATMENT
In light of the continuing trend of the Court to remove categories of
agreements from per se treatment and to scrutinize more agreements
under a quick-look or rule-of-reason analysis, as demonstrated by the
recent Leegin decision, per se treatment should be abolished. Generally,
per se treatment should be supplanted with the framework already used
by the Court to weigh the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects and
purposes of all types of agreements. Rapidly evolving global markets,
products, and technology- along with a general disfavor for the blunt
and dull edge of a per se analysis7 -should now compel courts to discard
the simplistic and anachronistic use of that test. As the Court suggested
in Leegin with respect to minimum resale price restraints, an agreement
that traditionally received per se treatment potentially can have
procompetitive justifications that merit at least a quick-look or even a
full rule-of-reason analysis.72 Therefore, the Court ultimately should
recognize the need to apply this reasoning to the four remaining
agreements that have traditionally received per se treatment under the
Sherman Act. A quick examination of the four remaining per se
categories will provide the adequate justifications.
68. Id. at 2716-23.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2721-22.
71. Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Per Se Violations in Antitrust Law: Confusing Offenses with
Defenses, 77 GEo. L.J. 165, 178 (1989) ("In antitrust law, there is no such thing as a per se offense or
conduct that merits per se invalidation.").
72. Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2714-16; see also Anlauf, supra note 55, at 5o9-IO ("The rule of reason is
better equipped to undertake full consideration of the economic harms and benefits which result from
tying arrangements.... The per se test fails to acknowledge the existence of potential benefits arising




Tying agreements (or "tie-in sales"), one of the remaining
traditional per se illegal categories under Sherman section i, should no
longer receive per se treatment by the Court and instead should be
scrutinized under a rule-of-reason analysis.73  The Court has
demonstrated its increased leniency towards tying agreements and
articulated its potential procompetitive justifications for such
agreements.74  With the increasing complexity of technologically
sophisticated goods, tying agreements have become more and more
commonplace.75  Today, many products involve some form of
procompetitive tying agreement between the "tying" or desired product
and the "tied" or undesired product. 6 Tying agreements can provide
convenience and utility to the consumer that can often outweigh the
previously feared anticompetitive effects of these agreements.77
Continued per se treatment of tying agreements will only invalidate an
ever-increasing number of agreements that would ultimately promote
innovation, consumer benefits, and efficiency. The Court already has
demonstrated its leniency towards tying agreements and the
procompetitive justifications for these agreements.
7r
73. For a similar argument, see Anlauf, supra note 55, at 478.
74. See, e.g., 11. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 45 (2006) ("Many tying
arrangements, even those involving patents and requirements ties, are fully consistent with a free,
competitive market."); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14-16 (1984); see also
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 89-95 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
75. See Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 90-94.
76. See id.; see also Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 44-45 ("[W]hile price discrimination may provide
evidence of market power, particularly if buttressed by evidence that the patentee has charged an
above-market price for the tied package, it is generally recognized that it also occurs in fully
competitive markets." (citation omitted)).
77. See Anlauf, supra note 55, at 51o ("Only a rule of reason approach which fully weighs the
economic benefits and anticompetitive effects imposes a rational analysis of antitrust tying liability.").
For example, when buying a personal computer, a consumer is required to purchase not only the
desired or tying product of the computer, but also all of its tied programs. See Microsoft Corp., 253
F.3 d at 87-88. This allows these additional programs to be offered at a lower price, which ultimately
benefits the consumer and allows the consumer to achieve the most utility out of his or her purchase
because without being able to tie such products, a consumer who was buying a personal computer
would have to purchase each item separately. See id. at 87. These separate items would include the
mouse, keyboard, Windows, Internet Explorer, etc., but because they are tied to the purchase of the
computer the consumer is able to obtain all these products at once at a lower price, and with greater
efficiencies. See id. at 87-88, 9o-95.
78. See Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 44-45; Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 11-12 ("It is clear,
however, that every refusal to sell two products separately [through a tying arrangement] cannot be
said to restrain competition. If each of the products may be purchased separately in a competitive
market, one seller's decision to sell the two in a single package imposes no unreasonable restraint on
either market, particularly if competing suppliers are free to sell either the entire package or its several
parts."); see also Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 87 (examining in detail several potentially
procompetitive tying arrangements and concluding that "not all ties are bad").
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It is also important to note that in addressing "exclusive dealing"
arrangements coupled with tying agreements, the Court has shifted
toward the rule of reason as well.79 After the Supreme Court decision in
Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, the lower courts
effectuated significant change in the decision standard for an illegal
exclusive dealing arrangement."' For example, the District of Columbia
Circuit Court in United States v. Microsoft Corp. reasoned that in such a
situation where there is an exclusive dealing arrangement coupled with a
tying agreement, "[a]pplying per se analysis to such an amalgamation
creates undue risk of error and of deterring welfare-enhancing
innovation., 8' The Court reasoned that allowing antitrust actions to
proceed virtually any time a firm enters into an exclusive dealing
arrangement would both discourage a presumptively legitimate business
practice and encourage costly antitrust actions2 This further illustrates
the modern inclination of the federal courts to at least hear and examine
potential procompetitive justifications (benefits to the consumer,
increased interbrand competition in a market, product innovation and
efficiencies) of traditionally per se illegal agreements to further facilitate
growth, expansion, efficiency, and maturity in the complex markets that
now constitute the world economy.
B. HORIZONTAL GROUP BoYcoTrs
The next traditional per se illegal category that should and will likely
receive a rule-of-reason or quick-look analysis is horizontal group
boycott agreements. Taking into account the purpose, power, and effect
of these agreements, in its most recent boycott opinion the Court has
already moved towards an approach reminiscent of a rule-of-reason
analysis."3 Traditionally, the per se test applied to cases in which firms
jointly worked to disadvantage competitors by either directly denying,
persuading, or coercing suppliers or customers to prevent or impede
79. Exclusive dealing arrangements that occur where tying agreements are involved require a
rule-of-reason analysis in the eyes of the Court because an investigation must be made regarding
market power, competitive effects, and competitive purposes. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 17-I8.
Although the Jefferson Parish Court stated that per se treatment is appropriate when market power is
"probable," it seems that by examining market power at all the Court is requiring something more
than per se treatment in every case. See id. In Jefferson Parish, the Court investigated the Hospital's
market power (part of a rule-of-reason analysis), and concluded that without sufficient market power,
an antitrust violation can only be established by continuing to investigate the anticompetitive and
procompetitive effects of such an agreement (the other part of the rule-of-reason analysis). Id. at 17-
25.
8o. Id. at 17-18. An exclusive dealing arrangement is commonly regarded as an "agreement
requiring a buyer to purchase all needed products from [a single] seller." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 607
(8th ed. 2004).
81. See 253 F.3d at 89-9o.
82. Id. at 84-95.
83. See FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 457-61 (1986).
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other relationships that the suppliers or customers need in a given
competitive struggle over markets."' Accordingly, the Court has
explained that an agreement which amounts to a horizontal group
boycott generally involves an unspecified number of the following
characteristics: (I) "the boycott... cuts off access to a supply, facility, or
market necessary to enable the boycotted firm to compete"; (2) the
boycotters have a dominant market position; and (3) there is no valid
procompetitive justification.85 The final factor enumerated by the Court
suggests a willingness to consider evidence relevant to a rule-of-reason
analysis when evaluating horizontal group boycotts. Moreover, even
presupposing these factors or so-called requirements, with the increasing
complexity of both domestic and foreign markets most horizontal group
boycotts could arguably have procompetitive effects promoting
interbrand competition leading to consumer benefits. For example, in
FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, the marketplace involved
competition among highly specialized professionals. 86 Even if competitors
were assumed to be targets, a horizontal group boycott could help self-
correct the market by creating market standards that need to be met,
regulations that must be followed, and procedures that are to be used,
thereby increasing consumer utility and satisfaction along with
encouraging innovation and efficiencies." As previously discussed,88 the
84. United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 217-24 (1940); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v.
United States, 356 U.S. I, 4-6 (1958).
85. Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 294-95 (1985).
86. 476 U.S. at 449-5
o .
87. See id. at 458-59. Although the Indiana Federation of Dentists Court purports to resolve the
case by refusing to classify the Federation's policy as a "group boycott," this is simply another example
of the Court eroding per se treatment without explicitly abolishing it. See id. at 458 ("Although this
Court has in the past stated that group boycotts are unlawful per se, we decline to resolve this case by
forcing the Federation's policy into the 'boycott' pigeonhole and invoking the per se rule." (citations
omitted)). However, it seems clear that group boycotts are sufficiently analogous to the Federation's
practice that they could, under the Court's analysis, potentially have procompetitive justifications that
would deserve a rule-of-reason analysis and could be such that might even survive such an analysis by
having those procompetitive effects outweigh the anticompetitive effects. Id. at 458-59. In this case,
there was an agreement among dentists that they would not furnish x-rays to dental insurance
companies. Id. at 451-52, 455. Insurance companies objected, wanting to see them before paying for
treatment that dentist would request based on the x-ray readings. Id. The dentists claimed that x-ray
submissions would deny coverage on the part of insurance carriers made by nondentists. Id. The
ultimate effect claimed by the dentists is that the habit of denying certain procedures will result in
dentists' inclination not to proscribe the procedures-taking a step to help people of Indiana. Id. at
452.
88. See Nw. Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 295 ("Although a concerted refusal to deal need not
necessarily possess all of these traits to merit per se treatment, not every cooperative activity involving
a restraint or exclusion will share with the per se forbidden boycotts the likelihood of predominantly
anticompetitive consequences."); see also NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, Ioi
(1984) (finding that per se treatment of the NCAA's restrictions on the marketing of televised college
football was inappropriate even though there was an obvious restraint on output because the "case




Court is willing to examine the procompetitive justifications for
horizontal group boycotts, an analysis that is strikingly similar to a full-
blown rule-of-reason analysis." Either way, the traditional per se
treatment of horizontal boycotts is no longer necessary or even justifiable
under the Court's current trend.
C. HORIZONTAL MARKET DIVISION
Another traditionally per se illegal category that should eventually
receive a rule-of-reason or at least quick-look analysis is horizontal
market division agreements. Although the Court has previously found
horizontal market division agreements to be per se illegal, today these
agreements can arguably have procompetitive justifications. As the
Court has already explained, the crux of the illegality of market division
agreements turns on whether the restraint involved is an ancillary or a
naked one.9' To determine whether there are ancillary or naked
restraints in a given market division agreement, the primary purpose of
the agreement must be scrutinized, which leads to a review that is like a
quick-look analysis and not per se treatment.9 Also, if the ancillary
restraint is linked with a legal agreement, the Court has reasoned that
the agreement might then have procompetitive justifications.92 Finally,
market division agreements may also lead to more efficiencies,
innovation, and greater consumer satisfaction, which are further
procompetitive justifications for such agreements. For example, a
horizontal market division agreement could allow potential competitors
to invest in facilities to better serve consumers in a certain area more
efficiently. This horizontal market division at least would raise the
procompetitive justifications, which should receive a rule-of-reason
analysis. This might arise where a specialized product particular to an
area is developed that might cost a great deal to market and develop in
that area. To develop the product (such as an agricultural product that is
89. See Nw. Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 295 ("The arrangement permits the participating
retailers to achieve economies of scale in both the purchase and warehousing of wholesale supplies,
and also ensures ready access to a stock of goods that might otherwise be unavailable on short notice.
The cost savings and order-filling guarantees enable smaller retailers to reduce prices and maintain
their retail stock so as to compete more effectively with larger retailers.").
9o . Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 48-50 (i99o ) (per curiam). Although in theory under
per se treatment it should not matter whether there is a naked restraint or an ancillary restraint, the
has Court acknowledged this difference along with the coinciding different analyses. See Texaco Inc. v.
Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 7 (2oo6) ("[C]ourts must determine whether the nonventure restriction is a naked
restraint on trade, and thus invalid, or one that is ancillary to the legitimate and competitive purposes
of the business association, and thus valid."). This approach is more analogous to a rule-of-reason
analysis than to a per se treatment line of reasoning.
9
i . See Texaco, 547 U.S. at 5-7 ("As a single entity, a joint venture, like any other firm, must have
the discretion to determine the prices of the products that it sells, including the discretion to sell a




specifically tailored to the special needs of a particular type of
geographic market), it might be necessary to allow a horizontal market
division agreement to be in place for at least some period of time to
cultivate the product and deliver it effectively and economically to
targeted consumers. This scenario demonstrates possible procompetitive
justifications and deserves a rule-of-reason analysis instead of per se
treatment. A similar situation arose in United States v. Topco Associates,
Inc., where the Court treated the horizontal market division as per se
illegal because it determined that the practices of a cooperative
association of small and medium-sized supermarket chains constituted a
horizontal restraint of trade.93 However, as the current trend of the Court
indicates, this situation no longer merits per se treatment because, as the
lower court in Topco found, the practices of the cooperative association
were arguably procompetitive since they enabled members of the
association to compete successfully with larger regional and national
chains.94
Of course, anticompetitive effects will still remain, but this is exactly
why a rule-of-reason analysis is necessary to determine the purpose,
power, and effect of the agreement without dismissing it as per se illegal
immediately. The Court's past willingness to scrutinize market division
agreements in a manner incompatible with the per se standard indicates
a willingness to examine the purpose and, eventually, the power and
effect of the agreement.95  Again, this trend is influenced by the
complexity of agreements and markets in our current economy. 6 Where
thirty years ago these enumerated per se agreements might not have had
any conceivable procompetitive justifications, the Court has consistently
recognized that in most, if not all, of these categories of agreements, this
is no longer the case.97
93. 405 U.S. 596, 596, 598-600, 6o8 (1972) ("We think that it is clear that the [market division]
restraint in this case is a horizontal one, and, therefore, a per se violation of § i [of the Sherman
Act].").
94. Even though the Topco Court ultimately dealt with the horizontal market division agreement
as per se illegal, it acknowledged that if such agreements were not given per se treatment,
procompetitive justifications for the agreement did exist under a rule-of-reason analysis. Id. at 605-o6.
("[T]he sale of Topco private label brands is far outweighed by the increased ability of Topco
members to compete both with the national chains and other supermarkets operating in their
respective territories." (quoting United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 103t, 1043 (N.D. Ill.
1970)). Unfortunately, the Court at that time was unwilling to treat one of the more traditionally per
se illegal agreements (market division) under a rule-of-reason analysis as the lower court had. See id.
95. See Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47-59 (I977); Topco Assocs., 405 U.S.
at 6o6-12.
96. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2ooi); see also Texaco,
547 U.S. at 4-5 (involving a complex oil agreement in which persons who were normally competitors
combined their capital allowing them to share opportunities for profits and risk of losses).
97. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9-17 (1984). See generally Nw.
Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985); Anlauf, supra note
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D. HORIZONTAL PRICE FIXING
The final and most-feared agreement traditionally held by the Court
to be per se illegal is the horizontal price fixing agreement.9 However,
even this type of agreement can have potentially procompetitive
justifications that, at the very least, warrants a quick-look analysis to
weigh the potential purposes regarding the market and the consumer. In
NCAA, decided in 1984, the Court began its frontal assault on the per se
treatment concept.' There, the Supreme Court held that a particular
type of horizontal price fixing agreement would not receive per se
treatment because in some industries horizontal restraints are necessary
to produce and procure the given market successfully, in this case college
football."° The broadcast networks contracted for a limited number of
broadcasts of football games sanctioned by the NCAA nationally and
regionally every year."' No team was allowed to be shown nationally
more than four times per year or regionally more than six times per
year.'2 The rule prohibited the NCAA member schools from negotiating
television rights outside of the plan." In that case, the Court reasoned
that the relevant market did not have to be defined, and market powers
and percentages did not need to be examined, because the plan of the
NCAA, on its face, made the price unresponsive to consumer demand
and was therefore a naked restriction on price or output. 4 Therefore,
the plan of the NCAA was "inconsistent with the Sherman Act's
command that price and supply be responsive to consumer
preference."15
However, the Court acknowledged and discussed the allegedly
procompetitive purpose of the NCAA plan, which was to protect live
attendance of games which would not be televised even if there was a
naked restraint."6 The Court held that the NCAA's purpose was not
procompetitive, as it eliminated consumer choice between live and
television broadcast football."'° In the end, the Court recognized that
"there is often no bright line separating per se from Rule of Reason
analysis, '°8 a view that only further justifies eliminating the per se test
and demystifying the Court's previous dichotomous per se and rule-of-
98. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. SOc'y, 457 U.S. 332,342-48 (1982) (setting forth a
brief history establishing the certainty of the per se illegality of horizontal price fixing agreements).
99. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
ioo. Id. at ioo-o2.
tot. Id. at 91-94.
102. id. at 94.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 104-13.
1O5 . Id. at IiO .
1O6. Id. at 115-17.
1O7. Id. at 116-I7.I o8. Id. at lO4 n.26.
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reason categories while also creating a more reasonable and logical way
of examining agreements in markets.
Ultimately, the Court in NCAA concluded that there were
alternative and commercially feasible ways that college football could be
shown on television.'" The plan eliminated these alternatives, denying
the possibility of consumer preference, meaning that the Court, sub
silentio, made a rudimentary market investigation, holding that live
games and telecast games are in the same market for some purposes. '
The Court then considered other competition restrictions to be sufficient
to guarantee nontelevised live football."' Market investigation is a key
element of a rule-of-reason analysis."2 If televised college football was
only feasible under the NCAA plan, the Court would have given a rule-
of-reason analysis to the plan as an ancillary restraint. Apparently, the
Court was willing to incorporate a partial rule-of-reason analysis for a
horizontal price fixing agreement.
In another case, involving Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS),
the Court again refused to give per se treatment to a horizontal price
fixing agreement when a new product was involved."3 The Court
reasoned that although the agreement was, legally speaking, horizontal
price fixing, the product created by the agreement would not exist
without the uniform price in the market brought about by the agreement
creating the product."4 This allowed the Court to decide that if the
agreement only involved "literal" price fixing that was in actuality not
comparable to a situation in which a group of like-minded competitors
I09. Id. at ii9.
iio. Id. at It 1-3. The Court even conceded that its market and competition investigation were
rooted in a rule-of-reason analysis, by explaining that
the NCAA television plan on its face constitutes a restraint upon the operation of a free
market, and ... it has operated to raise prices and reduce output. Under the Rule of
Reason, these hallmarks of anticompetitive behavior place upon petitioner a heavy burden
of establishing an affirmative defense which competitively justifies this apparent deviation
from the operations of a free market.
Id. at 113.
iii. Id. at II9 ("[T]he NCAA imposes a variety of other restrictions designed to preserve
amateurism which are much better tailored to the goal of competitive balance than in the television
plan.").
112. See id. at 109-13 (setting forth a detailed investigation of not only the market analysis
involving NCAA's agreement, but also NCAA's proffered competitive justifications for such an
agreement within that market); Bd. of Trade v. United States (Chi. Bd. of Trade), 246 U.S. 23 1, 238-39
(1918) (acknowledging that part of a rule-of-reason analysis is ascertaining the market power of the
parties involved in the agreement, which requires an in-depth market investigation).
113. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 7-1o, 24-25 (1979) (using many
elements of a rule-of-reason analysis to scrutinize a traditional per se category agreement of horizontal
price fixing).
I14. Id. at 7-10, 19-24.
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come together and fix the price, then a rule-of-reason analysis would be
applicable."5
Thus, horizontal price fixing has not been as diabolical and feared by
the Court as some of its opinions would indicate. The Court has
developed a willingness to deal with these agreements in certain
situations, as discussed above, where the Court went beyond the
dismissive procedure of per se treatment and examined the agreements
in more detail." 6 This is presumably because the Court thought that in
those instances there might be some justifications for the agreements. In
light of the Court's past willingness to go beyond per se treatment
regarding horizontal price fixing agreements, such treatment should
ultimately be abolished to make way for economic, social, and political
developments, and to produce a legal environment that will allow market
and product agreements to evolve in response to rapidly changing
economic and political conditions.
III. ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATIONS FAVOR THE ABOLISHMENT OF
PER SE TREATMENT
The growing complexity and interdependence of agreements and
commerce, domestically and abroad, militates against the per se
construct. Many agreements formerly given per se treatment are unique
in purpose, power, and effect and should be examined on a case-by-case
basis under a rule-of-reason analysis. These economic justifications for
doing away with the per se test further buttress the rationale found in
recent cases to accelerate the trend to reach this result.
A. TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION
Both in the United States and internationally, per se treatment will
have to be eliminated to allow agreements relating to technology to
survive the scrutiny of the Court. Such agreements exist to promote more
interbrand competition, innovation, and increased efficiencies within and
across markets."7 As articulated above, procompetitive tying agreements
promote technological innovation and, ultimately, pave the way for
consumers to benefit from modern technology-driven innovations." 8
Computer software and hardware, and ink jet printers are just a few
examples of the many products that consumers purchase that utilize or
contain tied technology."9 The court in Microsoft Corp. reasoned that
115. Id.
ii6. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2007); NCAA, 468
U.S. at 104-13; Broad. Music, Inc., 44I U.S. at 7-10.
117. See Anlauf, supra note 55, at 509; see also Donald L. Beschle, "What, Never? Well, Hardly
Ever": Strict Antitrust Scrutiny as an Alternative to Per Se Antitrust Illegality, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 471,
500-03 (1987) (criticizing the use of a per se rule in contemporary antitrust litigation).
118. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
i 19. See I11. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28,31-32 (2oo6) (ink jet printers); United
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current "technological integration [facilitated by a tying agreement] of
added functionality into software" can serve as a procompetitive
platform for third party applications while also potentially reducing costs
for the consumer.'2° In an increasingly wireless world, consumers will
benefit from products that are created through tying agreements to the
point where one device might perform all technology needs "tied" into
one product.' To encourage this trend and to allow U.S. firms to
compete, both domestically against foreign competitors and in foreign
markets, per se illegality of tying agreements is no longer appropriate. A
rule-of-reason analysis is necessary for those agreements that are
predominately procompetitive to be upheld. Such a change will benefit
the entire market and promote interbrand competition and innovation
among manufacturers while simultaneously providing lower prices and
providing more utility per product for the consumer.
B. GLOBALIZATION OF MARKETS
With both geographic and product markets shifting toward global
commerce, the traditional per se categories will most likely lose their
utility, leaving procompetitive and anticompetitive arguments and
justifications susceptible to a quick-look or rule-of-reason analysis. The
developments these agreements allow will facilitate growth and
competition in the global marketplace that will in turn also benefit the
United States' markets domestically by benefiting the American
consumer and interbrand competition. International organizations have
recognized the benefits of eliminating a broad per se rule and replacing it
with a rule-of-reason, case-by-case analysis. For example, in the treaty
establishing the European Union, the drafters foresaw the necessity for a
States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3 d 34, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (computer software and hardware).
120. 253 F.3d at 84, 87. The court further explained that, from the mere fact that two items are
compliments, or that one is useless without the other, it does not follow that the products are a single
product for the purposes of tying law. See id. at 86. Also, the court noted that in such situations
involving technology, a tying agreement might be procompetitive if the product creates a demand for
the tied product, separate from the tying product, sufficient to identify a distinct product market in
which it is efficient to offer the products in a bundle. See id. "Bundling [or tying] obviously saves
distribution and consumer transaction costs. This is likely to be true, to take some examples from the
computer industry, with the integration of math co-processors and memory into microprocessor chips
and the inclusion of spell checkers in word processors." Id. at 87 (citation omitted).
121. See Anlauf, supra note 55, at 5oi ("Particularly in the case of software and computer
hardware bundles, multiple products can be packaged as a single product.").
122. See id. at 502 ("Absent such coercion and with sufficient competition in the second market,
consumers benefit from the one-stop efficiencies of the tie-in."). Because tying agreements often allow
firms to foreclose the secondary market, in order for U.S. firms to compete against other firms able to
use tying arrangements without fear of per se illegality, tying agreements should be judged under a
rule-of-reason analysis. Id. at 507 ("Arguably, tying arrangements operate as a subset of a firm's
monopolization of either the tying or the tied market. Thus, tying arrangements then must be viewed
as a component of illegal monopolization and subject to a rule of reason analysis applied to
monopolization claims." (footnote omitted)).
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rule-of-reason analysis to overcome the broad stroke of per se treatment
by permitting a rule-of-reason analysis for any agreement "which
contributes to [the] improv[ed] production or distribution of goods or to
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a
fair share of the resulting benefit."'23 The drafters recognized, ten years
before Leegin, that with current global developments, most agreements
would require a rule-of-reason analysis. "' This will be accomplished by
the agreements allowing for lower prices that come with exploring global
options, encouraging innovation and efficiencies domestically to compete
with a more diverse global marketplace and also to provide the consumer
more utility through the many options that the expansion into the global
marketplace would allow.'25
There are several key industries that will benefit from abolishing per
se treatment of the four remaining categories of agreements to which this
test is applied. For example, the automobile industry will benefit from
increased flexibility with respect to tying agreements, in addition to
permitting procompetitive justifications for market division agreements
and group boycotts. Outside the United States, automobile
manufacturers are effectively boycotted by local governments in favor of
domestic products.26 The domestic manufacturers of automobiles should
be given room to compete against the more successful foreign producers
123. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, The Treaties Establishing
the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, art. 81, Nov. to, 1997, 97/C O.J. C34o2o8-o9.
124. See id.
125. See, e.g., Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 6 & n.i (2oo6). This case involved a joint venture
by the international gas companies Shell and Texaco that sold separately branded gasoline to service
station owners at a uniform price. Id. at 3-6. The Court declined to find the decision to sell both
brands of gasoline at a single price per se illegal as a form of horizontal price fixing. Id. at 5-6. Instead,
the Court reasoned that internal pricing agreements of a legitimate joint venture are not per se
unlawful because, "[a]s a single entity, a joint venture, like any other firm, must have the discretion to
determine the prices of the products that it sells." Id. at 6-7. Therefore, even an agreement which
involves some degree of horizontal price fixing is not necessarily illegal on its face and might deserve a
rule-of-reason analysis to examine the procompetitive justifications. Id. at 6 & n.i (recognizing that the
record from the court below contained voluminous economic justifications for creating the joint
venture).
126. See, e.g., F.M. Scherer, Retail Distribution Channel Barriers to International Trade, 67
ANTrrwRsT L.J. 77, 86 (1999) ("[Alllegations were advanced by U.S. advocates: (i) that restrictive
zoning and high land prices made it virtually impossible for U.S. auto makers to establish their own
dealerships within Japan; (2) that the retailers selling Japanese cars in Japan dealt exclusively in the
vehicles of the domestic manufacturer whose franchise they held, or, if they handled American cars at
all, did so unenthusiastically; (3) that because of restrictive governmental regulations regarding annual
auto safety inspections and longstanding ties between some 20,000 'designated' repair shops and
manufacturers, opportunities for U.S. companies to sell repair parts to Japanese automobile service
outlets were constrained; (4) that despite the sharp fall of the dollar relative to the yen in the late
198os, U.S. sales of original equipment parts to Japan increased only trivially; and (5) that in their
rapidly growing American transplant manufacturing operations., Japanese companies favored home
sources or U.S. sources owned by Japanese parents over U.S. producers in procuring original
equipment parts to be assembled into Japanese nameplate cars." (footnote omitted)).
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through the form of less restrictive group boycotts by producers,
consumers, the government, or some combination of the three.
Moreover, scrutinizing certain types of tying agreements (i.e., an
agreement that would allow U.S. auto manufacturers to tie other
products into their products) under a rule-of-reason analysis will allow
domestic auto producers to better compete with foreign manufacturers
that are not subject to the same limitations on tying agreements' (e.g.,
BMW's partnership with Apple, Inc. that ties both their technologies into
one automobile'28).
IV. POTENTIAL OBSTACLES STEMMING FROM THE ELIMINATION OF
PER SE TREATMENT
A. DIMINISHED JUDICIAL CERTAINTY AND CONSISTENCY
One of the two acknowledged benefits of per se treatment is the
judicial certainty that it provides. Having a formula that the courts can
apply allows for more certainty, efficiency, and consistency of outcome in
litigation. Abolishing per se treatment, especially at the initial stages, will
impose a system with very malleable standards that will take
considerable effort and experience for the U.S. Supreme Court to
develop over time. This will, in turn, make it even more difficult for
lower federal courts and state courts to apply the rule-of-reason analysis
to previously held per se categories. However, the quick-look analysis,
with or without a naked restraint, should reveal truly anticompetitive
agreements almost as clearly as per se treatment; the loss of
procompetitive agreements as false positives that hinder per se treatment
will therefore have ended. Therefore, the benefits from abolition will
ultimately outweigh the detriments.2 9
B. INCREASED COSTS OF LITIGATION
The second primary benefit per se treatment affords the courts is the
ability to curtail litigation and prevent the exhaustion of judicial and
financial resources.3° Having a judicial mechanism that allows the courts
127. See, e.g., Task Force Report: The Antitrust Guide for International Operations Revisited, 54
ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 857 (discussing how certain tying standards for international agreements are not
necessarily subject to the same standards under U.S. antitrust law).
128. See Automobile.com, BMW and Apple Computer Join Forces to Integrate iPod to OEM
Audio System, http://car-reviews.automobifle.com/news/bmw-and-apple-computer-join-forces-to-integrate-
ipod-to-oem-audio-systemtI99/ (last visited June sO, 2009).
129. See, e.g., Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 44-45 (2006); Texaco, 547 U.S. at
6-7; Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 295 (1985); NCAA
v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85. 101 (1984); see also Anlauf, supra note 55, at 509-1o.
130. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. I, 5 (1958) ("This principle of per se
unreasonableness not only makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by the Sherman Act
more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids the necessity for an incredibly
complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the industry involved, as
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in antitrust actions under the Sherman Act to hear evidence only
pertaining to the existence of certain agreements before dismissing the
action allows for a considerably shorter litigation process. After all,
antitrust litigation under a rule-of-reason analysis allows the parties to
proffer evidence that includes an investigation of the market history,
market power, and competitive justifications.'3' Without per se
treatment, the courts will only have the rule-of-reason and quick-look
analyses to scrutinize agreements, both of which can produce a longer,
more arduous litigation process.'32 However, quick-look and naked-
restraints analyses'33 will eliminate the need for full-scale rule-of-reason
evidentiary hearings in appropriate cases.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO OBSTACLES STEMMING FROM THE
PER SE ELIMINATION
A. PRETRIAL HEARINGS
One potential solution to curb the increased cost of litigation
resulting from the elimination of per se treatment would be to develop a
special pretrial hearing in antitrust actions under section I of the
Sherman Act. These hearings would be very similar to a generic early
pretrial scheduling hearing under the Federal Rules of Evidence and
Civil Procedure.'34 However, this type of pretrial hearing could be
structured specifically so that the plaintiff alleging the violation would be
well as related industries, in an effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been
unreasonable-an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken.").
131. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2712-13 (2007). Antitrust
litigation can also end up fostering battles of experts and long, drawn out settlement negotiations and
hearings that ultimately lead to an exhaustive fact-finding process. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 253 F.3 d 34, 47-48, 56-58, 65-66, ioi-o3 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that it took a seventy-six-day
bench trial just for the district court to make findings of fact).
132. Without per se treatment to quickly dispose of certain agreements on their face, the Court
will inevitably have to do at least some type of investigation for each agreement before the Court. See,
e.g., Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2712-13 (noting that rule-of-reason analysis entails an investigation of market
power, industry history and analysis, competitive justifications, etc.); Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526
U.S. 756, 769-71 (1999) (describing how even quick-look analysis requires some investigation into the
competitive justifications of an agreement); cf. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5 (stating that per se
treatment allows the Court to dismiss certain agreements on their face, saving the Court time and
resources).
133. See supra notes 45-53, 91 and accompanying text.
134. A pretrial hearing for antitrust cases would narrow and clarify basic issues between parties,
and would help ascertain the existence or whereabouts of relevant facts. Cf FED. R. Cv. P. 16. Like in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, there would be some established rules that would organize
expert testimony, require pretrial conferencing among the parties, and organize the evidence as a way
of synthesizing discovery before trial to alleviate some of the findings-of-fact burden on the trial court.
Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 26; Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 47-48 (it took the District Court a seventy-six-day
bench trial just to make findings of fact). Although the Microsoft court did not grant the hearing, it
considered allowing an evidentiary hearing to further explore some of the fact finding involved in the
case. See id. at 101-03.
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required to first plead the specifics of the alleged illegal agreements, and
then provide the defendant with a brief opportunity to provide some
procompetitive justifications for the agreement and an explanation for
why there is no naked-restraint effect. The structure of this type of
hearing would save the courts considerable time and money by saving
them from performing a lengthy and full-blown rule-of-reason
evidentiary analysis at trial because the procompetitive justifications and
naked-restraint arguments would already be in the record for prompt
evaluation. At this initial trial hearing, which would take place before
discovery and expert testimony, the court would be required to
determine the nature of the agreement (i.e., whether it is a horizontal
price fixing agreement, or a vertical resale price fixing agreement, tying
agreement, vertical boycott, etc.), the anticompetitive and
procompetitive justifications of the agreement, the purpose of the
agreement, and the power and effect of the agreement if a full rule-of-
reason analysis is necessary. In addition, the burden of proof would be on
the party asserting the agreement to be illegal under section I of the
Sherman Act to prove that a reasonable fact finder could find that the
agreement unreasonably restrains trade and that the anticompetitive
premises of the agreement not only exist but outweigh the
procompetitive justifications. This would initially orient the court to the
nature of the agreement, while exposing the restraints and
anticompetitive and procompetitive justifications.
B. QUICK-LOOK ANALYSIS
Most importantly, the Court has already provided an intermediate
standard between per se treatment and a rule-of-reason analysis that will
allow courts to fill the void efficiently. This middle ground, as previously
discussed, is the quick-look analysis articulated in California Dental
Ass'n.'35 Under a quick-look analysis, the court need only examine the
purpose of the agreement."36 While not rising to the stringent level of per
se treatment, a quick-look analysis allows courts to quickly dismiss
patently illegal agreements because they are only required to scrutinize
the purpose of the agreement without performing a drawn out rule-of-
reason analysis. '37 Through experience and stare decisis, courts will be
135. Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 769-71.
136. In California Dental, the Court reasoned that under a quick-look analysis, instead of focusing
on the effects of the agreement, the Court would focus on the competitive purpose behind the
agreement. Id. at 775 (discovering that the effects of the agreement were not readily apparent before
making a closer investigation of the purpose of the CDA's plan and determining that "the CDA's rule
appears to reflect the prediction that any costs to competition associated with the elimination of
across-the-board advertising will be outweighed by gains to consumer information (and hence
competition) created by discount advertising that is exact, accurate, and more easily verifiable (at least
by regulators)").
137. Throughout the California Dental Court's analysis, it is apparent that the main consideration
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able to determine which of the current per se agreements will receive a
quick-look or rule-of-reason analysis.'3" However, under a quick-look
analysis, courts will still be able to review each agreement on a case-by-
case basis (in addition to immediately being able to determine whether
the agreement is a naked restraint of trade), allowing them to weigh the
procompetitive justifications against the anticompetitive justifications
that are now apparent for nearly all types of agreements.
CONCLUSION
Abolishing per se treatment and implementing a system of rule-of-
reason and quick-look analyses will help promote efficiency in the
marketplace and provide benefits for consumers in a constantly evolving
and increasingly complex and diverse economy by allowing the courts to
fully consider the procompetitive justifications of each agreement on a
case-by-case basis. Because of the complex and diversified characteristics
of the current marketplace, using per se treatment is not only unrealistic
and inequitable but also discourages some of the very types of behavior
and consequences that antitrust theorists have argued should be
preserved, such as interbrand competition, consumer satisfaction, overall
product utility, innovation, and efficiency.'39 The Supreme Court's
abolition of per se treatment should be the inevitable trend in an ever-
changing economic landscape. Consequently, rule-of-reason and quick-
look analysis should survive as the only rational methods of scrutinizing
agreements for antitrust violations.
in any given quick-look analysis is the competitive purpose(s) of an agreement. See, e.g., id. at 781
("What is required, rather [than examining the many effects], is an enquiry meet for the case, looking
to the circumstances, details, and logic of a restraint.").
138. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2713 (2007) ("[T]he per se rule is
appropriate only after courts have had considerable experience with the type of restraint at
issue . ); see also Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 781 ("We have recognized ... that 'there is often no
bright line separating per se from Rule of Reason analysis,' since 'considerable inquiry into market
conditions' may be required before the application of any so-called 'per se' condemnation is justified."
(quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.26 (1984))).
139. See Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2715 (citing Brief of Arnici Curiae Economists in Support of
Petitioner at 16, Leegin, 127 S. Ct. 2705 (No. o6-480)) (arguing that resale price maintenance can
enhance consumer choices and utility); Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 44-45
(2oo6) (stating that tying agreements often occur in a procompetitive context in a competitive market);
Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 295 (1985) (pointing
out that not all boycotts are anticompetitive); Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. 433 U.S. 36, 52
(977) (describing the importance of interbrand competition).
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